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Abstract—Real-time monitoring applications have Internet-of-
Things (IoT) devices sense and communicate information (status
updates) to a monitoring facility. Such applications desire the
status updates available at the monitor to be fresh and would
like to minimize the age of delivered updates. Networks of such
devices may share wireless spectrum with WiFi networks. Often,
they use a CSMA/CA based medium access similar to WiFi.
However, unlike them, a WiFi network would like to provide
high throughputs for its users.
We model the coexistence of such networks as a repeated
game with two players, an age optimizing network (AON) and
a throughput optimizing network (TON), where an AON aims
to minimize the age of updates and a TON seeks to maximize
throughput. We define the stage game, parameterized by the
average age of the AON at the beginning of the stage, and
derive its mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE). We study
the evolution of the equilibrium strategies over time, when
players play the MSNE in each stage, and the resulting average
discounted payoffs of the networks. It turns out that it is
more favorable for a TON to share spectrum with an AON in
comparison to sharing with another TON. The key to this lies in
the MSNE strategy of the AON that occasionally refrains all its
nodes from transmitting during a stage. Such stages allow the
TON competition free access to the medium.
I. INTRODUCTION
The ubiquity of Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices has led
to the emergence of applications that require these devices
to sense and communicate information (status updates) to a
monitoring facility, or share with other devices, in a timely
manner. These applications include real-time monitoring sys-
tems such as disaster management, environmental monitoring
and surveillance [1, references therein], which require timely-
delivery of information updates to a common ground station
for better system performance, to networked control systems
like vehicular networks, where each vehicle broadcasts status
(position, velocity, steering angle, and etc.) to nearby vehicles
in real-time for safety and collision avoidance [2].
Such networks often share the wireless spectrum with
WiFi networks. For instance, the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) in the US opened up the 5.85 − 5.925
GHz band, previously reserved for vehicular communication,
for use by high throughput WiFi (802.11 ac) devices, leading
to the possibility of coexistence between WiFi and vehicular
networks [3]. Similarly, IoT devices like Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles (UAVs), equipped with 802.11 a/b/g/n technology,
operate in the 2.4 and 5 GHz bands in use by WiFi networks.
While a network of IoT devices would like to optimize
freshness of status updates, a WiFi network would like to
provide high throughputs for its users. We quantify freshness
using the metric of age of information [4] and refer to the
former network as an age optimizing network (AON) and to
the latter as a throughput optimizing network (TON).
In this work, we investigate the coexistence of an AON
and a TON when both networks use a WiFi like CSMA/CA
based medium access from a MAC layer perspective. We use
a repeated game theoretic approach. We assume networks are
selfish players and aim to optimize their respective utilities i.e.
an AON aims to minimize the age of updates and a TON seek
to maximize its throughput. Our specific contributions include
• We model the interaction between an AON and a TON
in each CSMA/CA slot as a non-cooperative stage game,
define the stage game which is parameterized by the
average age of the AON at the beginning of the stage
and derive its mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE).
• Our analysis shows that the equilibrium strategy of each
network is independent of the other network and the
equilibrium strategy of the AON in each stage is a
function of the average age seen at the beginning of
the stage. We study the subgame perfect equilibria that
involves players playing the equilibrium strategy in each
stage and analyse the evolution of these strategies over
time.
• We show that unlike prior works on coexistence of
CSMA/CA based networks, where networks access the
medium aggressively to maximize their respective util-
ities [5], in AON-TON coexistence, the requirement of
timely updates [4] by the AON makes it conservative.
Consequently, spectrum sharing with an AON becomes
beneficial for a TON in contrast to sharing with another
TON. Specifically, we show that the equilibrium strategy
of the AON occasionally refrains the AON nodes from
transmitting during a stage in order to ensure freshness
of updates. Such stages allow the TON competition free
access to the medium, therefore, improving its payoff.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
describes the related works. The network model is described
in Section III. This is followed by formulation of the game
in Section IV. In Section V, we discuss the results and we
conclude with a summary of our observations in Section VI.
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II. RELATED WORK
Works such as [3] and [6] study the impact of vehicular
communications on WiFi and vice versa. In these works,
authors look at the coexistence of vehicular and WiFi networks
as the coexistence of two CSMA/CA based networks, where
the packets of vehicular network take precedence over that of
WiFi. In contrast to [3] and [6], we look at the coexistence
problem as that of coexistence of networks which have equal
access rights to the spectrum, use similar access mechanisms
but have different objectives.
In [7] and [8] authors consider UAV applications. While
in [7] authors derive an optimum strategy for timely delivery
of data so as to minimize communication delay, in [8] authors
evaluate 802.11 n and 802.11 ac in a UAV setting in terms
of achievable throughput. Delay and throughput used in the
aforementioned works are commonly used performance met-
rics, however, they fail to measure the freshness of the updates.
In contrast to [7] and [8], we employ the age of information
metric, which adequately captures the freshness of updates.
Works such as [9] and [10] investigate age of information in
wireless networks.
Note that while throughput as the payoff function has been
extensively studied from the game theoretic point of view
(for example, see [5], [11]), age as a payoff function has
not garnered much attention yet. In [12] and [13], authors
study an adversarial setting where one player aims to maintain
the freshness of information updates while the other player
aims to prevent this. Also, in our preliminary work [14], we
propose a game theoretic approach to study the coexistence of
DSRC (Dedicated Short Range communication aka vehicular
communications) and WiFi, where the DSRC network desires
to minimize the time-average age of information and the WiFi
network aims to maximize the average throughput. We studied
the one-shot game and evaluated the Nash and Stackelberg
equilibrium strategies. However, the model in [14] did not
capture well the interaction of networks, evolution of their
respective strategies and payoffs over time, which the repeated
game model allows us to capture in this work. In this work,
via the repeated game model we are able to shed better
light on the AON-TON interaction and how their different
utilities distinguish their coexistence from the coexistence of
two utility maximizing CSMA/CA based networks.
III. NETWORK MODEL
We consider a network which consists of NA age optimizing
and NT throughput optimizing nodes that contend for access
to the shared wireless medium. We assume the number of
nodes is time-invariant. In general, both AON and TON nodes
access the medium using a CSMA/CA based mechanism in
which nodes use contention windows (CW) and one or more
backoff stages to gain access to the medium1. We model this
1In CSMA/CA, nodes employ a window based backoff mechanism to gain
access to the medium. The node first senses the medium and if the medium is
busy it chooses a backoff time uniformly from the interval [0, w− 1], where
w is set equal to CWmin. The interval is doubled after each unsuccessful
transmission until the value equals CWmax = 2mCWmin, where m is the
maximum backoff stage.
mechanism as in [15].
We assume that all nodes can sense each other’s packet
transmissions. This allows modeling the CSMA/CA mech-
anism as a slotted multiaccess system. A slot may be an
idle slot in which no node transmits a packet or it may
be a slot that sees a successful transmission. This happens
when exactly one node transmits. If more than one node
transmits, none of the transmissions are successfully decoded
and the slot sees a collision. Further, we assume that all nodes
always have a packet to send. The modeling in [15] shows
that the CSMA/CA settings of minimum contention window
(CWmin), number of backoff stages and the number of nodes
can be mapped to the probability with which a node attempts
transmission in a slot. We use this probability to calculate the
probabilities defined next. We will define the probabilities of
interest for a certain network of nodes indexed {1, 2, . . . , N}.
Let τi denote the probability with which node i attempts
transmission in a slot. Let pI be the probability of an idle slot,
which is a slot in which no node transmits. We have
pI =
N∏
i=1
(1− τi). (1)
Let p(i)S be the probability of a successful transmission by
node i in a slot and let pS be the probability of a successful
transmission in a slot. We say that node i sees a busy slot if
in the slot node i doesn’t transmit and exactly one other node
transmits. Let p(−i)S be the probability that a busy slot is seen
by node i. Let pC be the probability that a collision occurs in
a slot. We have
p
(i)
S = τi
N∏
j=1
j 6=i
(1− τj), pS =
N∑
i=1
p
(i)
S ,
p
(−i)
S =
N∑
j=1
j 6=i
τj
N∏
k=1
k 6=j
(1− τk) and pC = 1− pI − pS. (2)
Let σI , σS and σC denote the lengths of an idle, successful,
and collision slot, respectively. In this work, we assume
σS = σC. The other case of practical interest, for when using
RTS/CTS, is σS > σC. The analysis for this case can be carried
out in a similar manner to that in this paper. We skip the details
in this paper.
Next we define the throughput of a TON node and the age
of an AON node in terms of the above probabilities and slot
lengths.
A. Throughput of a TON node over a slot
Let the rate of transmission be fixed to r bits/sec in any slot.
Define the throughput Γi of a TON node i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , NT}
in a slot as the number of bits transmitted successfully in the
slot. This is a random variable with probability mass function
(PMF)
P [Γi = γ] =

p
(i)
S γ = σSr,
1− p(i)S γ = 0,
0 otherwise.
(3)
Using (3), we define the average throughput Γ˜i of node i as
Γ˜i = p
(i)
S σSr. (4)
The average throughput of TON in a slot is
Γ˜ =
1
NT
NT∑
i=1
Γ˜i. (5)
Note that the throughput in a slot is independent of that in the
previous slots.
B. Age of an AON node over a slot
Let ∆i(t) be the status update age of an AON node i ∈
{1, 2, . . . , NA} at other nodes in the AON at time t. When the
freshest update of node i at AON node j ∈ {1, 2 . . . , NA}\i at
time t is time-stamped u(t), the status update age, or simply
the age, of node i at node j is defined as ∆i(t) = t−u(t). We
assume that a status update packet that AON node i attempts
to transmit in a slot contains an update that is fresh at the
beginning of the slot. As a result, node i’s age either resets
to σS if a successful transmission slot occurs or increases by
σI, σC or σS at all other nodes in the AON, respectively, in
case an idle slot, collision slot or a busy slot occurs. Note that
node i’s age at the end of a slot is determined by its age at
the beginning of the slot and the type of the slot. Figure 1
shows an example sample path of the age ∆i(t) of a certain
AON node i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , NA}. In what follows we will drop
the explicit mention of time t and let ∆i be the age observed
at the end and ∆−i be the age observed at the beginning of a
given slot by node i.
The age ∆i, observed by node i at the end of a slot is
thus a random variable with PMF conditioned on age at the
beginning of a slot given by
P [∆i = δi|∆−i = δ−i ] =

pI δi = δ
−
i + σI,
pC δi = δ
−
i + σC,
p
(−i)
S δi = δ
−
i + σS,
p
(i)
S δi = σS,
0 otherwise.
(6)
Using (6), we define the conditional expected age
∆˜i
∆
= E[∆i = δi|∆−i = δ−i ].
= (1− p(i)S )δ−i + (pIσI + pSσS + pCσC). (7)
The average age of an AON at the end of the slot is
∆˜ =
1
NA
NA∑
i=1
∆˜i. (8)
∆i(t)
σS
∆i(0)
t1 t2 t3 tn tn+1t4 t5 t
Fig. 1: AON node i’s sample path of age ∆i(tn). ∆i(0) is the initial
age. A successful transmission resets the age to σS. The time instants
tn, where, n ∈ {1, 2, . . . }, show the slot boundaries. The inter-slot
intervals are determined by the type of slot.
IV. THE AGE-THROUGHPUT OPTIMIZING REPEATED
GAME
We define a repeated game to model the interaction between
an AON and a TON. In every CSMA/CA slot, networks must
compete for access with the goal of maximizing their expected
payoff over an infinite horizon (a countably infinite number of
slots). We capture the interaction in a slot as a non-cooperative
stage game G. The interaction over the infinite horizon is
modeled as the stage game played repeatedly in every slot
and defined as G∞. Next, we define these games in detail.
A. Stage game
We define a parameterized strategic one-shot game G =
(N , (Sk)k∈N , (uk)k∈N , ∆˜−), where N is the set of players,
Sk is the set of strategy of player k, uk is the payoff of player
k and ∆˜− is the additional parameter input to the game G,
which is the average age (8) of the AON seen at the beginning
of the slot. We define the game G in detail.
• Players: We have two players namely AON (A) and TON
(T). Specifically, N = {A,T}.
• Strategy: Let T denote transmit and I denote idle. For
AON comprising of NA nodes, the set of pure strategies
is SA , S1×S2×· · ·×SNA , where Si = {T , I} is the set
of strategies for a certain AON node i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , NA}.
Similarly, for the TON comprising of NT nodes, the set
of pure strategies is ST , S1 × S2 × · · · × SNT , where
Si = {T , I} is the set of strategies for a certain TON
node i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , NT}.
We allow networks to play mixed strategies. In general,
for the strategic game G, we can define Φk as the set
of all probability distributions over the set of strategies
Sk of player k, where k ∈ N . A mixed strategy
for player k is an element φk ∈ Φk, such that φk
is a probability distribution over Sk. For example, for
an AON with NA = 2, the set of pure strategies is
SA = S1 × S2 = {(T , T ), (T , I), (I, T ), (I, I)} and
the probability distribution over SA is φA such that
φA(sA) ≥ 0 for all sA ∈ SA and
∑
sA∈SA φA(sA) = 1.
In this work, we restrict ourselves to the space of proba-
bility distributions such that the mixed strategies of an
AON are a function of τA and that of a TON are a
1 2 5 10 500
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
NT
τ
∗ T
(a)
1 2 5 10 500
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
NA
τ
∗ A
 
 
∆˜− = NA(σS − σI) + σI
∆˜− = NA(σS − σI) + σS
(b)
Fig. 2: Access probability for (a) a TON, and (b) an AON with
∆˜− = NA(σS−σI) +σI and ∆˜− = NA(σS−σI) +σS, for different
selections of NA and NT.
function of τT, where τA and τT, as defined earlier, are
the probabilities with which nodes in an AON and a TON,
respectively, attempt transmission in a slot. Specifically,
we force all the nodes to choose the same probability to
attempt transmission. As a result, the probability distribu-
tion φA for an AON with NA = 2, parameterized by τA,
is φA = {φA(T , T ), φA(T , I), φA(I, T ), φA(I, I)} =
{τ2A, τA(1− τA), (1− τA)τA, (1− τA)2}.
Similarly, the probability distribution φW for a
TON with NT = 2, parameterized by τT, is
φW = {φW (T , T ), φW (T , I), φW (I, T ), φW (I, I)} =
{τ2T, τT(1− τT), (1− τT)τT, (1− τT)2}.
We therefore allow the AON and the TON to choose
τA ∈ [0, 1] and τT ∈ [0, 1], respectively, to compute the
mixed strategies.
• Payoffs: We have NT throughput optimizing nodes that
attempt transmission with probablity τT and NA age op-
timizing nodes that attempt transmission with probability
τA. Thus, by substituting τi = τT for i that is a TON
node and τi = τA for i that is an AON node, we can
calculate the probabilities (1)-(2) of both the TON and the
AON nodes. The probabilities can be substituted in (3)-(4)
and (6)-(7), respectively, to obtain the average throughput
in (5) and average age in (8). We use these to obtain
the stage payoffs uT and uA of the TON and the AON,
respectively. They are
uT(τA, τT) = Γ˜(τA, τT), (9)
uA(τA, τT) = −∆˜(τA, τT). (10)
The networks would like to maximize their payoffs.
B. Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium
As stated in [16], every finite strategic-form game has
a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE). Therefore, we
allow players to randomize between pure strategies and find
the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. For a strategic game
G defined in Section IV-A, a mixed-strategy profile φ∗ =
(φ∗A, φ
∗
T) is a Nash equilibrium [16], if φ
∗
k is the best response
of player k to his opponents’ mixed strategy φ∗−k ∈ Φ−k, for
all k ∈ N . We have
uk(φ
∗
k, φ
∗
−k) ≥ uk(φk, φ∗−k), ∀φk ∈ Φk,
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Fig. 3: Stage payoff of a TON and an AON for different selections of
NT and NA. The AON stage utilities correspond to ∆˜− = NA(σS−
σI) + σS.
where φ∗ ∈ Φ = ∏|N |k=1Φk is the profile of mixed strategy.
Since the probability distributions φA and φT are parameter-
ized by τA and τT, respectively, we find τ = [τ∗A, τ
∗
T] in order
to compute the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 1. The parameter τ = [τ∗A, τ∗T] required to
compute the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium φ∗ = (φ∗A, φ
∗
T),
for the 2-player one-shot game G when σS = σC is
τ∗A =
{
NA(σI−σS)+∆˜−
NA(σI−σC+∆˜−) ∆˜
− > NA(σS − σI),
0 otherwise .
(11a)
τ∗T =
1
NT
. (11b)
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix A.
As seen in (11a) and (11b), the access probabilities τ∗A
and τ∗T required to compute the equilibrium strategies of the
AON and the TON, respectively, have the following unique
properties: (i) both τ∗A and τ
∗
T are independent of the number
of nodes and access probability of the other network and (ii)
τ∗A in any slot is a function of average age observed at the
beginning of the slot i.e. ∆˜−. As a result, the equilibrium
strategy of each network is also its dominant strategy and the
equilibrium strategy of the AON in any slot is a function of
∆˜−.
Figure 2 shows the τ∗T and τ
∗
A for the TON and the AON,
respectively, corresponding to different selection of nodes in
the network. We show τ∗A for ∆˜
− = NA(σS − σI) + σI and
∆˜− = NA(σS − σI) + σS. This choice of ∆˜− gives τ∗A > 0
(see (11a)). Figure 2b shows that the access probability of the
AON increases from 0.0050 to 0.2512 with increase in ∆˜−
from NA(σS − σI) + σI to NA(σS − σI) + σS for NA = 2.
Also, the access probability of the AON decreases from 1 to
0.0004 as number of nodes in the AON increases from 1 to
50 for ∆˜− = NA(σS − σI) + σS.
A distinct feature of the stage game is the effect of self-
contention and competition on the network utilities which we
had also observed in our earlier work [14]. We define self-
contention as the impact of nodes within one’s own network
and competition as the impact of nodes in the other network.
Figure 3 shows the affect of self-contention and competition
on the network utilities, when networks play their respective
equilibrium strategies. As shown in Figure 3a, as the number
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Fig. 4: Illustration of per stage (a) throughput of a TON (b) age of an AON and (c) access probability of an AON and a TON wrt stage
obtained from an independent run. The results correspond to NA = 5, NT = 5, σS = σC = 1 + β, σI = β and β = 0.01.
of nodes in the AON increase, the payoff of the TON increases.
Intuitively, since increase in the number of AON nodes results
in increase in competition, the payoff of the TON should
decrease. However, the payoff of the TON increases. For
example, for NT = 2, as shown in Figure 3a, the payoff of the
TON increases from 0.1416 to 0.2281 as NA increases from 2
to 10. This increase is due to increase in self-contention within
the AON which forces the network to be conservative and
hence benefits the TON. Similarly as shown in Figure 3b, as
the number of TON nodes increases the AON payoff improves.
C. Repeated game
As the networks coexist over a long period of time, the
one-shot game defined in Section IV-A is played in every stage
(slot) n ∈ {1, 2, . . . }. We consider an infinitely repeated game,
defined as G∞ with perfect monitoring [16] i.e. at the end of
each stage, all players observe the action profile chosen by
every other player2. In addition to the action profiles, players
also observe ∆˜−n i.e. the average age of the AON at the end of
stage (n−1). We refer to ∆˜−n as the state variable. A feasible
strategy of the repeated game, in general, would depend on
the history of play and the state variable. However, here we
restrict ourselves to studying the subgame perfect equilibria
that involves the simplest kind of strategies i.e. players play the
MSNE in each stage. In a repeated game with no state variable
such a strategy would perhaps be uninteresting. However, our
game is a repeated game where the AON equilibrium strategy
as shown in (11a) in any stage is a function of the state
variable. The dependence of the AON equilibrium strategy on
the state variable intertwines the utilities of the networks, even
though the equilibrium strategy of each network is independent
of the other network and allows us to explore interesting
aspects of the game.
Figure 4 shows the payoffs (see (9)-(10)) and the access
probabilities of the TON and the AON for the repeated game
G∞. The results correspond to a AON-TON coexistence with
NA = NT = 5. Figure 4b and 4c, illustrating the evolution
of age and access probability of the AON, are interlinked.
As shown in (11a), τ∗A, is a function of age observed in the
2Assumptions such as imperfect and private monitoring are more realistic.
However, for ease of exposition, we assume perfect monitoring and propose
to study coexistence under other monitoring assumptions in the future.
beginning of a stage. The threshold value i.e. NA(σS − σI),
for NA = NT = 5, σS = 1 +β, σI = β and β = 0.01 is 5. As
a result, nodes in the AON access the medium with τ∗A > 0
in any stage n only if the average age in the (n− 1)th stage
exceeds a threshold value i.e. ∆˜−n > 5, otherwise τ
∗
A = 0. For
instance, in Figure 4c, τ∗A = 0 for n ∈ [37, 41] since ∆˜−n < 5,
however, for n = 42, τ∗A = 0.0030 as ∆˜
−
42 = 6.0700 exceeds
the threshold value.
Player k’s average discounted payoff for the game G∞,
where k ∈ N is
Uk = Eφ
{
(1− α)
∞∑
n=1
αn−1uk(φ)
}
. (12)
where, the expectation is taken with respect to the strategy
profile φ, uk(φ) is player k’s payoff in stage n and 0 < α < 1
is the discount factor. Note that a discount factor α closer to 1
means that the player values not only the stage payoff but also
the payoff in the future i.e. the player is far-sighted, whereas
α closer to 0 means that the player is myopic and values only
the current payoff. By substituting (9) and (10) in (12), we
can obtain the average discounted payoffs UW and UD of the
TON and the AON, respectively.
V. RESULTS
In this section, we first discuss the simulation setup and
later the results. For what follows, we set σI = β, 0 < β < 1,
and σS = σC = (1 + β). In practice, the idle slot is much
smaller than a collision or a successful transmission slot, that
is, β << 1. We select β = 0.01 for the simulation results
discussed ahead. We make different selections of NA and
NT to illustrate the impact of self-contention and competition.
Specifically, we simulate for NA ∈ {1, 2, 5, 10, 50} and NT ∈
{1, 2, 5, 10, 50}. We consider α ∈ [0.01, 0.99] for computing
the discounted payoffs. Different selections of α allow us to
study the behavior of myopic and far-sighted players. We use
Monte Carlo simulations to compute the average discounted
payoff of the AON and the TON. We compute the average over
100, 000 independent runs each comprising of 1000 stages. For
each run, we consider the initial age ∆˜−1 = σS = (1+β). Also,
we fix the rate of transmission r for each node in the WiFi
network to 1 bit/sec.
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Fig. 5: Discounted payoff of the TON and the AON to illustrate the
impact of coexistence. Networks under study comprises of 5 nodes
each.
To understand the impact of coexistence on the AON and
the TON, we consider three coexistence scenarios: (i) an
AON coexists with a TON, (ii) an AON coexists with another
AON and (iii) a TON coexists with another TON. Similar
to AON-TON coexistence, networks in AON-AON and TON-
TON coexistence randomize between pure strategies3. Figure 5
shows the discounted payoff with respect to the discount factor
α for the above coexistence scenario. We now discuss the
impact of AON on TON payoff and TON on AON payoff in
detail.
Impact of AON on TON payoff: As shown in Figure 5a,
a TON sees significant improvement in payoff when the
coexisting network is an AON. This improvement in TON
payoff is due to the dynamic nature of the AON equilib-
rium strategy (11a). The empirical frequency of occurence
of τ∗A = 0 when an AON coexists with a TON and each
network has 5 nodes is 0.13. This means that a TON gets
an additional 13% stages to transmit without any competition
from the AON in AON-TON coexistence as compared to TON-
TON coexistence. Consequently, the empirical frequency of
TON seeing a successful transmission increases from 0.027
as seen in TON-TON coexistence to 0.043 in AON-TON
coexistence. Also, the empirical frequency of failed transmis-
sions (collision) decreases from 0.624 as seen in TON-TON
coexistence to 0.017 in AON-TON coexistence. Table I shows
the empirical frequency of successful transmission, collision
and τ∗A = 0 for different scenarios under study.
Figure 6a shows the discounted payoff of a TON for
both AON-TON and TON-TON coexistence. As shown in
Figure 6a, the benefits for a TON in AON-TON coexistence
further increases, as the size of the AON network increases.
This is due to the increase in self-contention within the AON,
which forces it to be conservative. As shown in (11a), the
age threshold NA(σS − σI) increases with increase in NA.
3The parameter τ∗k , where k ∈ {AI,AII}, required to compute the mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium φ∗ = (φ∗AI , φ
∗
AII
), for AON-AON coexistence
with NAI and NAII nodes in AON I and II, respectively, is
τ∗k =

Nk(σI−σS)+∆˜−
Nk(σI−σC+∆˜−)
if ∆˜− > Nk(σS − σI),
0 otherwise .
Similarly, the parameter τ∗k , where k ∈ {TI,TII}, required to compute
the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium φ∗ = (φ∗TI , φ
∗
TII
), for TON-TON
coexistence with NTI and NTII nodes in TON I and II, respectively, is
τ∗k = 1/Nk .
TABLE I: Empirical frequency of successful transmission, colli-
sion and occurence of τ∗A = 0 for different coexistence scenarios
computed over 100, 000 independent runs with 1000 stages each.
Networks under study comprises of 5 nodes each and the calculations
are done for β = 0.01.
Coexistence
scenario
(I-II)
Frequency
of successful
transmission
in Network I
Frequency
of successful
transmission
in Network
II
Frequency of
collision
Frequency of
τ ∗A = 0
(I, II)
AON-AON 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.877, 0.877
AON-TON 0.021 0.043 0.017 0.13,NA
TON-TON 0.027 0.027 0.624 NA, NA
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Fig. 6: Variation in (a) discounted payoff of TON in TON-TON
(solid line) and AON-TON (dashed line) coexistence scenario and
(b) frequency of τ∗A = 0, with respect to increasing number of AON
nodes. Computations are done for β = 0.01 and α = 0.99.
As a result, the frequency of occurence of τ∗A = 0 increases.
We illustrate the increase in the frequency of occurence of
τ∗A = 0 with increasing number of AON nodes in Figure 6b.
This increase in the frequency of occurence of τ∗A = 0 works
in favour of a TON.
Impact of TON on AON payoff: As shown in Figure 5b, an
AON sees a larger age when it coexists with a TON as com-
pared to when it coexists with another AON. The frequency
of occurence of τ∗A = 0 as shown in Table I is 0.877 and
0.13 for AON-AON and AON-TON coexistence, respectively.
While the frequency of occurence of τ∗A = 0 in AON-AON
coexistence is higher than in AON-TON coexistence, the age
in the former coexistence scenario is still smaller than that in
the latter. This is due to the increase in contention from the
TON, which has a static equilibrium strategy τ∗T = 1/NW
and which increases the probability of collision from 0.002 in
AON-AON coexistence to 0.017 in AON-TON coexistence as
shown in Table I. Therefore, spectrum sharing with a TON is
detrimental for an AON as compared to sharing with another
AON.
VI. CONCLUSION
We formulated a repeated game to study the coexistence
problem between age and throughput optimizing networks. We
characterized the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the stage
game and studied the evolution of the equilibrium strategies
over time and the resulting average discounted payoffs of
the networks. We showed that unlike TON-TON coexistence
where nodes in both the networks access the medium aggres-
sively to maximize their respective throughputs, in AON-AON
coexistence, the requirement of timely updates of the AON
makes it conservative and occasionally refrains its nodes from
accessing the medium. This works in favour of the TON,
therefore, making spectrum sharing with an AON beneficial for
a TON in comparison to when a TON shares the medium with
another TON. In addition, we showed that spectrum sharing
with a TON is detrimental to an AON in comparison to sharing
with another AON.
REFERENCES
[1] I. Bekmezci, O. K. Sahingoz, and S¸. Temel, “Flying ad-hoc networks
(fanets): A survey,” Ad Hoc Networks, vol. 11, no. 3, pp. 1254–1270,
2013.
[2] H. Hartenstein and L. Laberteaux, “A tutorial survey on vehicular ad hoc
networks,” IEEE Communications magazine, vol. 46, no. 6, pp. 164–171,
2008.
[3] J. Liu, G. Naik, and J.-M. J. Park, “Coexistence of dsrc and wi-fi: Impact
on the performance of vehicular safety applications,” in Communications
(ICC), 2017 IEEE International Conference on. IEEE, 2017, pp. 1–6.
[4] S. Kaul, M. Gruteser, V. Rai, and J. Kenney, “Minimizing age of
information in vehicular networks,” in Sensor, Mesh and Ad Hoc
Communications and Networks (SECON), 2011 8th Annual IEEE Com-
munications Society Conference on. IEEE, 2011, pp. 350–358.
[5] M. Cagalj, S. Ganeriwal, I. Aad, and J.-P. Hubaux, “On selfish behavior
in csma/ca networks,” in INFOCOM 2005. 24th Annual Joint Conference
of the IEEE Computer and Communications Societies. Proceedings
IEEE, vol. 4. IEEE, 2005, pp. 2513–2524.
[6] G. Naik, J. Liu, and J.-M. J. Park, “Coexistence of dedicated short range
communications (dsrc) and wi-fi: Implications to wi-fi performance,” in
Proc. IEEE INFOCOM, 2017.
[7] M. Asadpour, D. Giustiniano, K. A. Hummel, S. Heimlicher, and S. Egli,
“Now or later?: Delaying data transfer in time-critical aerial commu-
nication,” in Proceedings of the ninth ACM conference on Emerging
networking experiments and technologies. ACM, 2013, pp. 127–132.
[8] S. Hayat, E. Yanmaz, and C. Bettstetter, “Experimental analysis of
multipoint-to-point uav communications with ieee 802.11 n and 802.11
ac,” in 2015 IEEE 26th Annual International Symposium on Personal,
Indoor, and Mobile Radio Communications (PIMRC). IEEE, 2015, pp.
1991–1996.
[9] Y. Sun, E. Uysal-Biyikoglu, R. D. Yates, C. E. Koksal, and N. B. Shroff,
“Update or wait: How to keep your data fresh,” IEEE Transactions on
Information Theory, 2017.
[10] R. D. Yates, “Lazy is timely: Status updates by an energy harvesting
source,” in Information Theory (ISIT), 2015 IEEE International Sympo-
sium on. IEEE, 2015, pp. 3008–3012.
[11] L. Chen, S. H. Low, and J. C. Doyle, “Random access game and medium
access control design,” IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON),
vol. 18, no. 4, pp. 1303–1316, 2010.
[12] G. D. Nguyen, S. Kompella, C. Kam, J. E. Wieselthier, and
A. Ephremides, “Impact of hostile interference on information freshness:
A game approach,” in Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc,
and Wireless Networks (WiOpt), 2017 15th International Symposium on.
IEEE, 2017, pp. 1–7.
[13] Y. Xiao and Y. Sun, “A dynamic jamming game for real-time status
updates,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1803.03616, 2018.
[14] S. Gopal and S. K. Kaul, “A game theoretic approach to dsrc and wifi
coexistence,” in IEEE INFOCOM 2018 - IEEE Conference on Computer
Communications Workshops (INFOCOM WKSHPS), April 2018, pp.
565–570.
[15] G. Bianchi, “Performance analysis of the ieee 802.11 distributed coor-
dination function,” IEEE Journal on selected areas in communications,
vol. 18, no. 3, pp. 535–547, 2000.
[16] Z. Han, D. Niyato, W. Saad, T. Bas¸ar, and A. Hjørungnes, Game
Theory in Wireless and Communication Networks: Theory, Models, and
Applications. Cambridge University Press, 2011.
[17] S. Gopal, S. K. Kaul, and R. Chaturvedi, “Coexistence of age and
throughput optimizing networks: A game theoretic approach,” arXiv
preprint arXiv:1901.07226, 2019.
APPENDIX A
MIXED STRATEGY NASH EQUILIBRIUM (MSNE)
We define τ∗ = [τ∗A, τ
∗
T] as the parameter required to
compute the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the one-shot
game. We begin by finding the τ∗A of the AON network by
solving the optimization problem
OPT I: minimize
τA
uA
subject to 0 ≤ τA ≤ 1.
(13)
where, uA is the payoff of the AON network defined as
uA = (1− τA(1− τA)(NA−1)(1− τT)NT)∆˜−
+ (1− τA)NA(1− τT)NT(σI − σC) + σC
+ (NAτA(1− τA)(NA−1)(1− τT)NT
+NTτT(1− τT)(NT−1)(1− τA)NA)(σS − σC).
The Lagrangian of the optimization problem (13) is
L(τA, µ) =uA − µ1τA + µ2(τA − 1).
where µ = [µ1, µ2]T is the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT)
multiplier vector. The first derivative of the objective function
in (13) is
u′A = −∆˜−(1− τT)NT [(1− τA)(NA−1) − (NA − 1)
τA(1− τA)(NA−2)] + (σS − σC)[(1− τT)NT (NA(1− τA)(NA−1)
−NA(NA − 1)τA(1− τA)(NA−2))−NANTτT(1− τT)(NT−1)
(1− τA)NA−1]− (σI − σC)NA(1− τT)NT (1− τA)(NA−1).
The KKT conditions can be written as
uA − µ1 + µ2 = 0, (14a)
−µ1τA = 0, (14b)
µ2(τA − 1) = 0, (14c)
−τA ≤ 0, (14d)
τA − 1 ≤ 0, (14e)
µ = [µ1, µ2]
T ≥ 0. (14f)
We consider three cases. In case (i), we consider µ1 = µ2 = 0.
From the stationarity condition (14a), we get
τA =
(1− τT)(∆˜− −NA(σS − σI)) +NANTτT(σS − σC)(
(1− τT)NA(∆˜− + (σI − σC)−NA(σS − σC))
+NANTτT(σS − σC)
) .
(15)
In case (ii) we consider µ1 ≥ 0, µ2 = 0. Again, using (14a),
we get µ1 = u′A. From (14f), we have µ1 ≥ 0, therefore,
u′A ≥ 0. On solving this inequality on u′A we get, ∆˜− ≤ ∆˜−th,0,
where ∆˜−th,0 = NA(σS − σI)− NANTτT(σS−σC)(1−τT) .
Finally, in case (iii) we consider µ1 = 0, µ2 ≥ 0. On solv-
ing (14a), we get ∆˜− ≤ ∆˜−th,1, where ∆˜−th,1 = NA(σS − σC).
Therefore, the solution from the KKT condition is
τ
∗
A =

(1− τT)(∆˜− −NA(σS − σI)) +NANTτT(σS − σC)
(1− τT)NA(∆˜− + (σI − σC)−NA(σS − σC))
+NANTτT(σS − σC)
∆˜
−
> ∆˜
−
th ,
1 ∆˜
−
< ∆˜
−
th & ∆˜
−
th = ∆˜
−
th,1,
0 ∆˜
−
< ∆˜
−
th & ∆˜
−
th = ∆˜
−
th,0.
(16)
where, ∆˜−th = max{∆˜−th,0, ∆˜−th,1}. Under the assumption that
length of successful transmission is equal to the length of
collision i.e. σS = σC, (16) reduces to
τ∗A =

NA(σI − σS) + ∆˜−
NA(σI − σC + ∆˜−)
∆˜− > NA(σS − σI),
0 otherwise .
(17)
Similarly, we find τ∗T for the TON network by solving the
optimization problem
OPT II: minimize
τT
− uT
subject to 0 ≤ τT ≤ 1.
(18)
where, uT is the payoff of the TON network defined as
uT = τT(1− τT)(NT−1)(1− τA)NAσS.
The Lagrangian of the optimization problem (18) is
L(τT, µ) =− uT − µ1τT + µ2(τT − 1).
where µ = [µ1, µ2]T is the KKT multiplier vector. The first
derivative of uT is
u′T = (1− τA)NA(1− τT)(NT−1)σS
− (NT − 1)τT(1− τT)(NT−2)(1− τA)NAσS.
The KKT conditions can be written as
−u′T − µ1 + µ2 = 0, (19a)
−µ1τT = 0, (19b)
µ2(τT − 1) = 0, (19c)
−τT ≤ 0, (19d)
τT − 1 ≤ 0, (19e)
µ = [µ1, µ2]
T ≥ 0. (19f)
We consider the case when µ1 = µ2 = 0. From the (19a),
we get u′T = 0. On solving the stationarity condition, we get
τ∗T = 1/NT, which is also the solution of the KKT conditions.
